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Abstract
In most economies, macroeconomic policy is conducted by two or more independent
authorities. In general, each policymaker has a diﬀerent piece of information about the
state of the economy, and this information is diﬀerent from the one held by the private
sector. We extend the model of James and Lawler [2011], of asymmetric and imperfect
information, to account for the existence of two independent policymakers. The active
policymakers can choose optimally what policy rule to follow, what information to
share with the other policymakers, and what information to share with the public.
This paper studies the social value of public information when the policymakers are
active. We ﬁnd that improving the quality of the signals transmitted to the private
sector can increase the expected value of welfare. If both policymakers seek to maximize
expected welfare, full information sharing between authorities achieves higher expected
welfare than no information sharing at all.
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Morris and Shin [2002] study the social value of information in an economy with a con-
tinuum of private agents that diﬀer in the information they possess. Each agent receives
a noisy private signal about the state of the economy, which is otherwise unobservable.
A policymaker produces a public signal about the underlying state, possibly adding noise
to its own information. The question is what is the precision of the public signal that
maximizes expected welfare. They show that disclosure of more precise information to the
private sector by a single policymaker is not always welfare improving. James and Lawler
[2011] extend Morris and Shin [2002]’s framework to allow for an active policymaker that
is choosing its policy optimally. Under active policy, revealing more precise information to
the private sector is never optimal, in a global sense.
However, policy in most economies in the world is dictated by two or more policymakers.
In general, each policymaker has a diﬀerent piece of information about the state of the
economy, and this information is diﬀerent from the one held by the private sector. Moreover,
in recent years, there has been a trend to grant independence to monetary authorities. Thus,
policymakers tend to be independent from each other. In this paper we study what is the
social value of information when there are two policymakers, instead of only one.
We ﬁnd that improving the quality of the signals transmitted to the private sector can
increase the expected value of welfare. If both policymakers seek to maximize expected
welfare, full information sharing between authorities achieves higher expected welfare than
no information sharing at all. Then full information sharing and partial transparency can
be a local maximizer of expected welfare.
2 The James and Lawler [2011] framework with two policy-
makers
This section is heavily based on James and Lawler [2011].
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of private sector agents, indexed by i 2 [0;1],
and two policymakers, indexed by l 2 f1;2g. Agent i chooses the action ai 2 R to maximize
the payoﬀ function
ui =  r(ai      g1   g2)













where 0 < r < 1 is a known constant,  is a random variable representing the underlying
state of the economy and gl is policymaker l’s instrument. As in Morris and Shin [2002], 
follows a uniform distribution over the real line.
2The payoﬀ function corresponds exactly to James and Lawler [2011]’s formulation, with
the exception of the presence of two policy instruments. In particular, it implies that
the eﬀect of the policy instruments are perfectly aligned: whatever can be achieved with
g1, can be achieved with g2. The policy instruments are perfect substitutes in the payoﬀ
function. Note also the presence of a “beauty contest” term: deviations of the chosen action
from the average action are costly for the private agents. This generates the strategic
complementarity in the actions of the private sector.
Before making its choice of gl, the policymaker l observes a noisy signal, zl, of , where
zl =  + l





, assumed to be independent of  and other noise terms
to be deﬁned next, for all l, with E (l3 l) = 0 for l = 1;2.
We assume that the policymakers are able to share information without revealing it to
the private sector. In particular, each policymaker can transmit the signal
wl = zl + !l






is assumed independent of , l and all other noise terms that remain to be deﬁned.
With both signals at hand, the l-policymaker updates its expectation about ,







and produces the public signal














. The noise term is assumed independent of ,
, ! and all other noise terms that remain to be deﬁned.
The policymakers commit to follow a disclosure rule: they add noise to their information,
sampling from normal distributions with given variances. These variances controls the
degree of disclosure of the signals. The case of full disclosure to the private sector is
captured by 2
l; = 0. Zero disclosure to the private sector arises as 2
l; ! 1. In the same
way, full disclosure to the other policymaker is captured by 2
l;! = 0, and zero disclosure
(no sharing of information to the other policymaker) arises as 2
l;! ! 1.
Each private sector agent observes y  [y1;y2]
0 and its own idiosyncratic noisy private
signal
xi =  + "i





, is assumed independent
of , , ! and , with E ("i"j) = 0 for j 6= i and
 1
0 "jdj = 0.
3We assume that private signals are observed only by the agent that receives them.
Moreover, no agent is able to observe the chosen action of any other agent before making
its own decision. Therefore, agent i’s expectation of any variable is conditioned only on the
observed values of y and xi, while that of the policymaker l is conditioned on zl, !k and
yk.











































































































































































































































+ (1   r)Ei (a)
4where a =
 1
0 aidi denotes the average action. Thus, the optimal action ai depends on
agent i’s expectations on , zl, wl and a.





where the value of the rule parameters, l
l, 3 l
l , is public knowledge, for l = 1;2. Here we
have an additional degree of disclosure of the policymakers.
3 Linear equilibrium
3.1 Private sector
We ﬁrst determine each agent’s action, taking the value of the rule parameters and the
quality of the public signals as given. We then identify the values of k
l which maximize
social welfare (E (Wj)) as a function of 2
l;!, 2
l;. This is the optimal policy.
Following Morris and Shin [2002], we guess that agent i’s action is a linear function of
the observed signals,
ai = 0xi + 1y1 + 2y2
Given
 1
0 "idi = 0, it follows that




After substituting policy rules and agent i’s conditional expectations, we can solve for
the unknown coeﬃcients in the equation







+ (1   r)Ei (a)






























for k = 1;2. Note that 0 +
P2















Thus we have perfect substitution of policy instruments and perfect alignment of ob-
jectives. This of course will make cooperation between the policymakers more attractive to
them.
Substituting the equilibrium actions ai = 0xi +
P2
l=1 lyl and the policy rules gl =
l
lzl + 3 l




















and integrating over i and taking expected values we have








































The FOC w.r.t. t































































































































6and this derivatives are independent of .
Thus the FOCs give us a system of four linear equations in four unknowns, and generi-
cally we have a unique solution. We can solve for the optimal l
l , 3 l
















be the value function E (Wj)j=. We can ask the
comparative statics question: does more precision of the signals produced by the policy-
makers improve expected welfare?
3.3 Passive policymakers
In Morris and Shin [2002]’s model, the policymakers commit themselves to follow the policy
rules, announcing the coeﬃcients l
l, 3 l
l , l = 1;2. Other agents believe the announcement
and choose their actions. But the policymakers are passive, in the sense that their policy is
not optimally chosen. We start our analysis by asking how the expected welfare depends on
the precision of the signals produced by the policymakers, when they do not choose their
policy optimally.
For simplicity, we focus on the case in which the policymakers fully share information
between them. We want to know under what condition is better to fully disclose information
to the private sector than to reveal nothing. Let 2
l;! = 0 for l = 1;2.
If in addition 2
l; ! 1 for l = 1;2 (zero disclosure to the private sector), then
1

































































































































































































The following proposition presents the main result of this subsection.
Proposition 1. Let 2
" > 0, 2



















































































for all s 2 ( 1;s1)
S
(s2;1).
Proposition 1 gives us conditions under which full disclosure is better than no disclosure
at all.
A case of interest occurs when s = 0. This is the inactive policymaker from Morris and





















This is a similar result to the one obtained by Baeriswyl [2011] (eq 14).
84 Active policymakers
4.1 No information sharing among policymakers
Consider the benchmark case of no information sharing among policymakers. Then there is
no information contained in the signal wk and the policy rule takes the form gl = l
lzl. The
public signal produced by the l-policymaker is yl = zl + l (because l
 = 1, or El () = zl)
and expected welfare simpliﬁes to
























l; for l = 1;2, the l-policymaker chooses l
l to maximize ex-
pected welfare. Let l










= E (W1j)j= and choose 2
1;;2
2; to maximize welfare.
We now consider the symmetric equilibrium. If 2
1; = 2
2; = 2
, then the optimal






























, and we get the following result for the optimal selection of the degree of
disclosure, for symmetric policymakers.
Proposition 2. Let 2
" > 0, 2



































and thus is maximized when 2
 ! 1.













 (1   r) + 24
 (1   r)
2r   1











Proposition 2 shows that zero disclosure is always optimal. But when the strategic
complementarity in the private sector optimal action is weak, r > 1
2, an interior optimum
arises. We have 22
" < 2
 < 1, and thus partial informative signals can globally maximize
9expected welfare as well. This breaks James and Lawler [2011]’s result. Note however that
full disclosure is never globally optimal.
This result is similar to the one in Morris and Shin [2002]: when private signals are
not that informative, increasing the accuracy of public signals can be welfare improving. In
this model, the active policymakers act as “private” agents, maximizing their own objectives
given their information sets. Thus, when 2
! ! 1, the precision of the private information
in the economy is reduced, and Morris and Shin [2002]’s kind of result kicks in.
The intuition is as follows: when the policy authorities produce public signals, the weight
that the private agents assign to their own private signals decrease, due to the strategic
complementarity. That is, private information is less relevant for decision making. On the
other hand, the public signals help to transmit the information content of policymakers’
private signals. This information transmission is complemented, for the active policymakers,
with the optimal choice of the policy coeﬃcients. When the strategic complementarity is
weak, the welfare cost of increasing the precision of public signals is reduced, and an interior
optimum arises.
If 2
! < 1, this result does not hold. The reason is that private information is more
precise, and it is optimal for the policymakers to transmit this information through the
choice of the policy, avoiding the costs associated with partially informative public signals.
In that case, the mechanisms highlighted by James and Lawler [2011] dominate.
4.2 Full information sharing among policymakers
Consider the case in which the policymakers choose to cooperate with each other. We
assume that the cooperation consists in complete information sharing. In this case 2
l;! = 0
for l = 1;2. The policy rule takes the form gl = l
lzl+3 l
l z3 l. The public signal produced
by the l-policymaker is yl =
zl+z3 l
2 + l (because l
 = 1
2) and expected welfare simpliﬁes
to

























where the coeﬃcients k are evaluated when 2
l;! = 0.
We now consider the symmetric equilibrium. If 2
1; = 2
2; = 2
, then the optimal




2 . Also, when 2
1;! = 2








w;3 l. Imposing these constraints, it
can be shown that the function E (W0j) depends only on the sum l
l + l
3 l. The optimal
policy in the symmetric case chooses the sum of the policy coeﬃcients to maximize expected









10Proposition 3. Let 2
" > 0, 2


































and thus is maximized when 2
 ! 1.
Proposition 3 shows that zero disclosure is always optimal, and it is the unique degree















and thus the full information sharing policy achieves a higher welfare level, with zero dis-
closure to the private sector, than the no information sharing policy. This, of course, is due
to the fact that under information sharing the policymakers receive two informative private
signals, instead of one.







". Two policymakers are able to obtain a higher level of welfare. The
reason is that adding up policymakers is adding up informative private signals in this sim-
ple model, increasing the precision of the information available to the policymakers. In
particular, two policymakers playing a symmetric equilibrium achieve the same optimal





In the linear rational expectations equilibrium we have ai = 0xi +
P2
l=1 lyl. After sub-
stituting for xi, y1 and y2, we can compute the sample mean a =
 1
0 aidi. The sample













where we used the appropriate law of large numbers. It can be shown as well that the








































and thus the sample dispersion of equilibrium actions (and expectations about the average
action), under optimal policy and disclosure, is lower when the policymakers share private
information than when they don’t. That is, more cooperation between active policymakers
reduces the dispersion of actions and expectations in the economy.
4.4 Nonmonotonic behavior of expected welfare
Expected welfare is a highly nonlinear function of 2
l;!, 2
l;, l = 1;2. We analyze the shape
of this function for the symmetric case using two numerical examples, to illustrate the
nonmonotonicity of expected welfare with respect to the precision of the signals produced
by the policymakers.
We set 2
" = 1 and 2
 = 0:75. Thus policymakers receive more precise signals. The
results, however, do not depend on this assumption.
Figure 1 shows the expected welfare when r = 0:4.
The left panel presents expected welfare when the policymakers are passive. In partic-
ular, we set l
l =  0:5 and l
3 l =  0:4. Thus s = l
l + l
3 l =  0:9. We apply Proposition
1: for these parameter values, we have that s < s1 and thus full disclosure is better than no
disclosure, when 2
! = 0. But expected welfare is a decreasing function of 2
!, and therefore
full information sharing and full disclosure globally maximize expected welfare.
The right panel of Figure 1 presents expected welfare when the policy is optimal. We see
that increasing information sharing between policymakers (decreasing 2
!) always improves
welfare, because it is an improvement on the quality of private signals. More importantly,
we note that when the information sharing is low (large 2
!), then a reduction in 2
 (more
disclosure to the private sector) can be welfare improving, even when the policymakers set
policy optimally. This breaks the con-transparency result of James and Lawler [2011].
Figure 2 shows the expected welfare for symmetric policymakers when r = 0:6 and
2
! ! 1. This Figure illustrates Proposition 2: expected welfare is globally maximized at
2
 = 16:3217. For high levels of disclosure (small 2
), more disclosure can locally improve
the expected welfare. The right panel shows the function in more detail. There is a local
minimum, and at the right of it the function is always increasing. As 2
 ! 1 we also
achieve the maximum expected welfare.







































l =  0:5, l
3 l =  0:4 Optimal policy
Parameters: r = 0:4, 2
" = 1, 2
 = 0:75.
Figure 2: Expected welfare, symmetric case, no information sharing

















Parameters: r = 0:6, 2
" = 1, 2
 = 0:75.
We summarize the results in the following remark.
Remark 1. Expected welfare is increasing in the precision of the signals shared among
policymakers. When the information sharing is low, more disclosure to the private sector
can be welfare improving.
5 Conclusions
We show that when two policymakers cannot share information among them, and are
choosing optimally a symmetric policy, then publication of partial informative signals can
globally maximize expected welfare, when strategic complementarity is weak in the private
sector.
13We ﬁnd that improving the quality of the signals transmitted to the private sector
can increase the expected value of welfare, specially when the quality of the information
received by the policymakers is low. In particular, when the information sharing among
policymakers is low, more disclosure to the private sector can be welfare improving.
Finally, more information sharing is welfare improving, and more cooperation between
active policymakers reduces the dispersion of actions and expectations in the economy.
These results weaken the con-transparency result of James and Lawler [2011], when
there are two active policymakers. As most economies in the world have two or more poli-
cymakers, this analysis is relevant and of practical importance. The policy implications are
clear: more information sharing between the policy authorities is welfare improving; and
more transparency can be welfare improving, even if the policymakers play a Nash equi-
librium in a noncooperative game. Political and social constraints might make impossible
to play the no disclosure equlibrium that globally maximizes expected welfare. Thus, au-
thorities subject to exogenous constraints could improve expected welfare choosing a local
maximum. This makes a case for optimal partial transparency.
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